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poration's non-public activities, and therefore it can not require the peti-
tioner to secure a certificate just because it may become a common carrier
in the future. If the petitioner does become an actual common carrier, then
it may be required to submit to the regulation of the Commission.35
The common practice in California bears out and is in accord with the
interpretation of the California statutes. There are many instances in the
past where oil and gas corporations have secured permits under the Mineral
Leasing Act for pipelines across federal property. In each case a common
carrier clause was included and accepted by the applying corporation and
yet not once has such a corporation been declared a public utility.
Conclusion
Dedication is a beneficial prerequisite to state regulation, for it neces-
sarily excludes regulation of many small producers who are defined by the
technical language of the code ".... but are too restricted to merit public
concern." G It also encourages corporations to indulge in new enterprises.
Richfield does not extend nor does it limit the requirement of dedication.
It does make the requirement more certain in application. Nevertheless,
there is reason to believe the question of dedication will continue to arise in
litigation until the broad language of the Public Utilities Code is revised
by the legislature to include dedication and provide a clear definition.
On the basis of section 1858 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,37
it was recently held that a court can not write into a statute, by implication,
express limitations which the legislature itself has not seen fit to include
in the statute.38 Yet this has been done in the case of dedication. If the
legislature would define dedication with respect to becoming a public
utility, that meaning would be binding upon the courts,39 and corporations
desiring not to become regulated utilities would have a more concrete basis
on which to plan their business activities.
Robert L. Bletcher*
35 Commercial Communications v. Public Util. Comm'n, 50 Cal. 2d 512, 327 P.2d
513 (1958).
3oRichfield Oil Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, supra note 33, at -, 354 P.2d at 12,
6 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
37 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1858 provides: "In the construction of a statute... the
judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein,
not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted ......
38 People v. White, 122 Cal. App. 2d 551, 265 P.2d 115 (1954).
39 Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 12 Cal. 2d 633, 86 P.2d 826 (1939).
* Member, Second Year class.
BUSINESS REGULATION: Ambit of Municipal Control
Business regulation by state and local governmental units raises the
perennial problem of the scope of power of the sovereign. While generally
the sovereign has absolute power, the United States Constitution places
limits on the sovereign power which can be exercised by the federal and
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state governments respectively.' The state constitutions in turn place limits
on the state and local governmental units in their relations with each other.
California has two constitutional provisions which limit the power of the
state or local governments. The state and local governments are both lim-
ited by the state provision which forbids imprisonment for civil debt.2 The
local governmental units are limited by the provision which allows them
to pass local, police, and sanitary regulations which do not conflict with
state law.3 Both of these provisions have been applied in recent cases to
determine important questions of municipal business regulation.4
Recent Cases
The area of possible regulation of modern business by California state
and local governments has been brought into sharper focus in the recent
cases of Agnew v. City of Culver City (1959)5 and In re Groves (1960).1
Section 16240 of the California Business and Professions Code provides
that every person who commences or carries on any business, trade, or pro-
fession, or calling, for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is
required by any law of the state, without taking out or procuring the li-
cense prescribed by such law, is guilty of a misdemeanor. This state criminal
statute gave rise to a conviction for conducting a business without a munic-
ipal license in the 1960 case of In re Groves. Groves secured the necessary
state license7 to operate a milk products plant but failed to obtain a mu-
nicipal license which was required by the Palm Springs, California, Ordi-
nance Code." He was charged with a failure to comply with the Palm
Springs Ordinance Code 9 and convicted of a violation of the state law. 1°
There was no criminal law penalty provided for by the Palm Springs
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 which enumerates the powers granted specifically to the
federal government; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 limits the power of the federal government;
U.S. CONST. amend. X, grants to the states all powers not specifically given the federal
government; there are additional specific restrictions such as the 5th amendment on fed-
eral power and the 14th amendment on state power.
2 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
3 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
4 1n re Groves, 54 Cal. 2d -- , 351 P.2d 1028, 4 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1960); Agnew v.
City of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571 (1959); Agnew v. City of Los Angeles,
51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958); Agnew v. City of Culver City, 147 Cal. App. 2d 144,
304 P.2d 788 (1956).
5 Agnew v. City of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571 (1959).
6 In re Groves, supra note 4.
7See CAL. Acaic. CODE §§ 660, 661.
8 PALM SPRIrNcs, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE, chs. 21, 22: § 2111, "It is unlawful for any
person . . . to commence, manage, engage in, conduct or carry on any business, vocation,
profession, calling, show, exhibition or game.., in this city, without first having procured
a license from the City of Palm Springs to do so ....... § 2131, "No person shall be
licensed to carry on an activity requiring a state license unless he has such a license."
§ 2133, "No person shall be licensed to carry on an activity requiring a permit under
some other city ordinance unless he has secured such a permit."
9 PALM SPRINGS, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § 2111.
10 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16240.
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Code.11 Groves' petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the
California Supreme Court.
The regulatory and revenue raising aspects of modem business in Cali-
fornia have become amazingly complex as indicated by the intricate manner
of conviction in In re Groves. Groves unsuccessfully contended that the
municipal ordinances involved were regulatory in nature, and hence the
municipality of Palm Springs was constitutionally precluded from enforc-
ing the statutory scheme on the theory it conflicted with a comprehensive
state law regulatory scheme and was unreasonably burdensome. This argu-
ment was based on the California Constitution, article XI, section 11, which
declares, [a]ny ... city ...may make and enforce within its limits all
such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws." The supreme court pointed out that the ordinances were
not accurately characterized as regulatory but were only revenue raising
measures, relying partly on the 1959 case of Agnew v. City of Culver City. 2
The municipality was not precluded from enforcing them as revenue rais-
ing measures even though there was also a state law provision to which
compliance had in fact been made.1 3 The area of revenue raising measures
is open to municipal control, in addition to state control, since in essence
the tax is a tax on the privilege of doing business.. 4 Assuming the tax is
reasonable in amount, it is constitutional to compel a business enjoying
municipal benefits to share the municipal burdens and responsibilities.
The Agnew Decisions
In re Groves is also a clarification of the statutory picture of business
regulation in California by criminal sanctions. It further amplifies the now
well known Agnew cases.15
Agnew v. City of Culver City0 held that where the municipal ordinances
were part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme rather than merely rev-
enue raising measures they were unconstitutional as unreasonably burden-
some, since they were in conflict with a comprehensive state regulatory
11 PALM SPRInGS, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § 2132.1 provided that "The criminal pen-
alties provided for by this code shall not be applied to businesses or professions requiring
a state license as a condition precedent to doing business in this city, nor as a method
of obtaining collection of the license fee."
"2 Agnew v. City of Culver City, supra note 5.
23 Nor is there anything inherently obnoxious in the requirement that a person engag-
ing in a business shall have two licenses, one issued by the state, and another by a political
subdivision or public corporation. City and County of San Francisco v. Boss, 83 Cal. App.
2d 445, 189 P.2d 32 (1948); Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 N.E.2d
590 (1939).
'4 In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 699, 195 Pac. 406, 406 (1921); Franklin v. Peterson,
87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 731, 197 P.2d 788, 790 (1948); City of San Mateo v. Mullin, 59
Cal. App. 2d 652, 654, 138 P.2d 351, 352 (1943); In re Johnson, 47 Cal. App. 465, 468,
190 Pac. 852, 854 (1920). See also Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 476-77, 211
P.2d 564, 570-71 (1949); Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 445, 168 P.2d
767, 768 (1946).
15 Agnew v. City of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571 (1959); Agnew v.
City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958); Agnew v. City of Culver City,
147 Cal. App. 2d 144, 304 P.2d 788 (1956).
16 Agnew v. City of Culver City, supra note 5.
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scheme. It also held the criminal sanctions to enforce the scheme were
invalid. The other two Agnew decisions, Agnew v. City of Culver City
(1956) 1 7 and Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1958)18 reached substantially
similar results. After the Agnew decisions many municipalities, including
Palm Springs, denominated their licensing statutes revenue raising measures
rather than regulatory measures 9 to avoid any possible conflict with Article
XI, section 11, of the state constitution.
This characterization would seem also to preclude application of the
municipality's criminal law sanctions to enforce the municipal ordinance
provisions since such sanctions would be a violation of the state constitu-
tional provision2" prohibiting imprisonment for civil debt according to Ag-
new v. City of Culver City.2 1 The state criminal law statute is not a violation
of the California constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for civil
debt.
In re Groves holds squarely that the state criminal law sanctions can
constitutionally be applied to enforce municipal revenue raising ordinances.
There are conflicting dicta, possibly unintentional, in In re Groves and Ag-
new v. City of Culver City22 as regards municipal criminal law sanctions
to enforce municipal revenue raising ordinances. In re Groves states through
Judge Traynor that "cities may tax businesses carried on within their bound-
aries and enforce such taxes by requiring business license for revenue and
by criminal penalties."23 Agnew v. City of Culver City in dicta voiced by
Judge McComb states that ". . . licenses . . . may be required by public
agencies requiring payment of license fees for revenue purposes only under
duly and legally adopted ordinances enforcible by civil process only .... 24
In re Groves would seem to control as the more recent pronouncement
of the supreme court on the issue by way of dicta. It is interesting to note
that Judge McComb concurred in the dissent in In re Groves but the issue
as to the possible conflict with his opinion in Agnew v. City of Culver City25
as to enforcement of municipal revenue measures by municipal criminal
law sanctions was not raised in the dissent. Neither case is directly in point
on the issue whether municipal revenue raising ordinances may be enforced
by municipal criminal law sanctions. Agnew v. City of Culver City26 in-
volved a municipal regulatory rather than municipal revenue raising ordi-
nance. In re Groves involved a municipal revenue raising ordinance but
17 Agnew v. City of Culver City, 147 Cal. App. 2d 144, 304 P.2d 788 (1956).
Is Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958).
19 PALM SPRINGS, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § 2132.1.
20 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil
action." In Agnew v. City of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571 (1959) the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said in dicta that a license fee for revenue raising purposes could
only be enforced by civil process. Any ordinance provisions providing for criminal process
were unconstitutional. In In re Groves, supra note 4, there is dicta to the effect that mu-
nicipal revenue measures are constitutional.
21 Agnew v. City of Culver City, supra note 5.
22 Ibid.
23 54 Cal. 2d -- , 351 P.2d 1028, 1030, 4 Cal. Rptr. 844, 846 (1960).
2451 Cal. 2d 474, 475, 334 P.2d 571, 572 (1959).
25 Agnew v. City of Culver City, supra note 5.
26 Ibid.
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